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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate if tariffs affect manufacturing value added in 25 countries from Central 
and Southeast Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and Middle East and North Africa 
over the period1990-2010. We use an instrumental variable approach, with the World Trade 
Organization bound tariff and the lagged tariff as instruments. Results suggest that, in general, lower 
tariffs seem to lead to higher value added, through the higher imports of inputs in the production 
process which were either inexistent or more expensive on the domestic market previously. The effect 
is not driven by the World Trade Organization membership, but by individual countries’ decision to 
lower their tariffs. However, there are notable differences in the effects between different groups of 
countries and industries: tariffs are not found to affect industrialization in Southeast Europe and 
Middle East and North Africa, which implies that their decision to liberalize trade was likely pre-
mature. This is supported by the finding that lower tariffs have positive effects on industry value 
added only in industries with higher value added (i.e. more mature industries).  
Keywords: industrialization, trade liberalization, tariffs 
JEL classification: F13, F42  
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1. Introduction  
Do tariffs affect industrialization patterns? In this paper, we investigate this relationship using data for 
the industry value added and tariffs for the transition economies of Central Eastern Europe and Baltics 
(CEEB) and Southeast Europe (SEE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the 
economies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Over the preceding two decades, 
these countries faced different patterns and speeds of (de)industrialization. Mishandled privatization, 
insufficient structural reforms and incapability to attract FDIs made the economies of SEE and CIS to 
deindustrialize faster than CEEB, whose industrialization patterns, instead, were mainly shaped by the 
relatively fast transition process and better geographical positioning. On the other hand, MENA 
countries failed to elevate their low industrial level. However, many of them committed to trade 
liberalization, mainly determined by their will to join to the World Trade Organization (WTO). If 
tariffs somehow affect industrialization patterns, their timely reduction may have brought benefits for 
industries, while pre-mature liberalization may have worked detrimentally. 
The paper faces two challenges: the first is the comprehension of the channels through which tariffs 
potentially affected industrialization; the second is the accounting of endogeneity of tariffs. Namely, 
trade policy is usually a part of the industrial policy and the sectorial tariffs are designed to promote 
sectorial policy goals, the most prominent being shielding infant industries. We test three potential 
channels through which tariffs may affect industrialization patterns: import, export and productivity. 
The paper makes references to the role of WTO. 
We cover 25 countries from the regions of CEEB, SEE, CIS and MENA over the period 1991-2010. 
The selection is fully driven by the availability of data at the industry level. The panel data allow for 
reducing the bias from omitted variables or model specification that plagues cross-country studies and 
rule out factors that would keep manufacturing underdeveloped as those factors should not affect the 
differences between manufacturing industries. We take advantage of two instruments. The first is the 
bound tariff rate set by WTO: it is likely to be exogenous with respect to the industry value added, 
because it is determined by the WTO. More precisely, it is unlikely that it is correlated with the 
shocks onto the value added, because it has been set in advance. It is also likely to be correlated with 
the tariff rate that countries charge, because it represents a ceiling for the actual rates. Second, we use 
lagged tariffs as instruments as they are likely correlated with the tariffs of the next period and are 
uncorrelated with the current shocks on the value added. 
Results robustly support trade liberalization, but only for mature industries. We find that lower tariffs 
have likely resulted in higher value added, overall, and that this has been through the higher imports 
and unlikely through productivity; export materialized as the significant channel in a comparative 
geographical context, albeit only in the CEEB. We find no evidence that this has been due to the 
WTO membership, but due to countries’ autonomous decision to lower the tariffs. We further 
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document that lower tariffs resulted in higher value added in the CEEB and CIS countries but played 
no role for industrialization in MENA and SEE, which could be explained by the possibly pre-mature 
trade liberalization in these countries.  
The theoretical background of the paper is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 offers some stylized facts. 
Section 4 describes the methodology and the data used, with special reference to the endogeneity of 
the tariffs. Section 5 presents the baseline results including a battery of robustness checks, while 
Section 6 offers a comparative analysis between the four regions involved, and mature versus young 
industries. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background and relevant literature 
The starting point in the analysis is the Trade Liberalization Hypothesis (TLH). The TLH posits that 
trade liberalization leads to static and dynamic efficiency gains through stimulating investment, export 
expansion, GDP growth as well as export and output diversification in favour of manufactured goods 
(Balassa, 1978, 1980; Bhagwati, 1978, 1988; Krueger, 1978, 1980; World Bank, 1987). TLH’s 
philosophy – the theory of static comparative cost advantage – has been the ingredient of 
conditionalities imposed on (developing) countries for their accession in multilateral, regional and 
bilateral trade agreements, the most prominent example being the acceptance into the WTO. TLH 
recommends reduction of the level and dispersion of import tariff rates, removal of import quotas, 
licences and other quantitative restrictions, removal of export taxes and subsidies and devaluation of 
national currency so as to compensate for the removal of protection or remedy overvaluation 
(Shafaeddin, 2010). The universality principle behind TLH implies that it is applicable to all 
countries, irrespective of their level of development and industrial capacity, and to each country over 
time.  
But has the application of TLH led to improved welfare: export expansion and industry 
diversification? Empirical results remain mixed. Neo-liberal strand of literature (e.g. Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, 1997) finds some evidence in favour of the TLH. Other strand of literature (e.g. 
Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Rodrik, 2007; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008; ECLAC, 2002; Di Maio, 
2008) finds little or no evidence that greater trade openness impacts growth. Specifically, the 
(de)industrialization effects of greater trade liberalization have been particularly examined and results, 
while being dependent on the level of industrial development, are also largely inconclusive. For 
instance, some researchers found that manufacturing productivity increased after an episode of 
liberalization (Handoussa et al. (1986) for Egypt, Tybout and Westbrook (1995) for Mexico, and 
Tybout et al. (1991) for Chile). On the other hand, Stiglitz (2005) argues that with the tariff and other 
quantitative restrictions reduction, workers not necessarily move to high-productivity jobs, as such are 
not created when the economy is in low stages of development, but rather become unemployed. 
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Indeed, Shafaeddin (2006a,b) documents that trade liberalization effects depend on the stage of 
industrialization. For instance, for nearly half their sample, they find that liberalization was followed 
by rapid expansion of export of manufactured goods and fast expansion of industrial supply capacity 
and upgrading; and this group of countries undertook gradual and selective trade liberalization only 
after industries matured. On the other hand, they document that countries with insufficiently 
developed industrial base, like in Africa and in most of Latin America, premature trade liberalization 
brought de-industrialization, in the lines of Stiglitz (2005). Similarly, the results of the trade 
liberalization on manufacturing are not clear-cut in other part of the literature (e.g. Harrison, 1994, 
Harrison and Revenga, 1995). 
Baldwin (2011) argues that earlier research failed to estimate neatly the trade liberalization effects 
because trade liberalization theory overlooked the radical change in globalization that occurred from 
the mid-1980s. Pre 1980s international competition occurred mainly at the level of sectors, whereas 
later it occurs at a finer degree of resolution – the level of production stages. As a result of 
information communication technology revolution it became increasingly economical to 
geographically separate manufacturing stages; that is to unbundle the factories which made it easy for 
rich-nation firms to combine the high technology they developed at home with low-wage workers 
abroad.2 Within the supply chain, the developing nation only has to provide reliable workers and a 
hospitable business environment. Thus, apart from rushing to unilaterally lower their tariffs 
(especially on intermediate goods), the developing countries unilaterally reduce behind the border 
barriers to doing business. Although industrialization became easier due to the technological 
advances, the geographical proximity matters greatly in supply chains since key personnel must still 
visit the offshored factory (Gamberoni et al.2010). Thus, most production networks concentrate in 
low wage countries that are near the high-technology nations (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales, 2014). 
There are three main channels through which tariffs can affect industry value added. As tariff is 
imposed on import, the first channel is through imports. Tariff effects on production are studied in 
many standard international economics textbook (e.g. Krugman and Obstfeld, 2014). Namely, a tariff 
increases the cost of import, making it less attractive, which could translate in larger costs for 
producers’ inputs in case they cannot find a substitute on the domestic market, hence affecting 
producers’ value added negatively; or could translate in a competitive gain for producers of 
substitutes to the imported good, in which case their value added may increase (at least in the short 
run). 
The second channel is through exports. The effects of tariffs on exports are indirect (unless taxes are 
levied on exports). Lerner (1936) showed that there is a symmetry between the effect of an import 
tariff and an export tax on domestic relative prices. In other words, a tariff may reduce the incentive to 
                                               
2Deardorff and Park (2010) provide detailed explanation about modelling trade between developed and 
developing countries based on exchange of capital-intensive and labour-intensive intermediates. 
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export by increasing the relative domestic price of import to export, which is equivalent to reducing 
the relative price of export to import. Tokarick (2006) adds two additional explanations of how tariff 
could affect export: i) with the tariff, consumers may shift demand toward the domestic good (if 
considered a substitute to the imported good), which is now cheaper in relative terms. Hence, the tariff 
actually reduces the price of export relative to non-traded goods, which is equivalent to a real 
exchange rate appreciation, which harms export; and ii) the tariff may make capital more expensive, 
especially in developing economies which import capital. Under the assumption of capital mobility 
across sectors, higher rental rate on capital would spread across sectors, hence raising the cost of 
production in the export sector and reducing output. 
The third channel is through the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA; Balassa, 1965). The RCA 
index measures industry’s actual comparative advantage in production and trade. The RCA approach 
argues that if a country’s share in world export of a particular good is greater than its overall share in 
total world export, then the country has a revealed comparative advantage in exporting that good.3 
Balassa argued that export/import ratios would be more influenced by protectionist measures (as 
tariffs; Hamilton and Svensson, 1982), while the relative export shares, as RCA is, would be more 
reliable indicators of comparative advantage. The lower the trade costs, such as tariffs, the better the 
RCA measureand more equivalent is with production-based indicators of comparative advantage 
(Moenius, 2006). The latter reflects the productivity level of industries, which were frequently very 
low when waves of tariff reductions phased in transition economies. Essentially, they were 
unprepared to compete on foreign markets, and hence their value added has been negatively 
affected.Nevertheless, the trade liberalization effect on the comparative advantage development might 
be driven by the success in attracting FDI and its sectoral destination (Barry and Hannan, 2001). Thus, 
trade liberalization accompanied by knowledge-related spillovers from FDI may enhance the 
industry’s comparative advantage. This is particularly expected in case of efficiency-seeking FDI 
which requires access to imports of intermediate goods and services and is thus dependent onan open 
trade regime (Lesher and Miroudot, 2008) 
Earlier empirical analyses focused on the effects of trade liberalization on productivity, growth and 
employment in various countries and regions.4To the best of our knowledge, the literature has not 
considered the channels through which tariffs can affect industry value added in the Central and 
                                               
3 Hilman (1980) discusses the relation between the “revealed comparative advantage” and “comparative 
advantage” and provides the conditions for correspondence. As Hinloopen and Van Marrewijk (2008) argue, 
violations of the Hillman condition are small as a share of the number of observations and occur rarely after 
1985. 
4 For example, OECD (2011) on the impact of trade liberalization on jobs and growth in G20; Ernst (2005) on 
the effects of trade liberalization on export orientationand employment in Argentina, Braziland Mexico; Paus et 
al. (2003) on the relationship between trade liberalization and manufacturing productivity in Latin America; 
Aichele and Heiland (2014) on the impact of China’s WTO entry on value chains; Amiti and Konings (2007) on 
the effects of trade liberalization on plant productivity in Indonesia; Harding and Rattso (2010) on the effects of 
tariffs on labour productivity in South Africa. 
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Southeast Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and Middle East and North Africa in a 
comparative geographical context. This is where the paper makes contribution to the current sparse of 
knowledge. 
 
3. Some stylized facts 
The manufacturing value added in transition economies has been on a steady decline in the past two 
decades. The possibly oversized industrial sector at the beginning of the 1990s, the structural reforms 
(including the long and thorny process of privatization in many cases) and political challenges largely 
determined the deindustrialization over the 1990s. Still, industryvalue added continued to decline over 
the 2000s as well, particularly in SEE and CIS. Slow structural reforms, absence of industrial policies, 
absence or improper policies for attracting FDI (which largely populated the service sectors), 
improper education policies (favouring social sciences), poor infrastructure, are among the reasons of 
the continuing deindustrialization. 
SEE’s deindustrialization has been more pronounced than that of other ex-socialist countries (Figure 
1). Different patterns of (de)industrialization are observed in these countries: while the CIS suffered 
the same destiny as SEE, the CEEB countries saw a smaller decline in the manufacturing value added, 
supported by the favourable georgaphic position, the relative fast completion of the transition process 
and the associated structural reforms, which all led to quickacession to the EU. Finally, while 
deindustrialization is not observed in the MENA, it is obvious that these countries failed to 
industrialize over the past two decades, given their low level of initial industrialization. 
Figure 1 – Manufacturing value added in a comparative context 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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While the patterns of (de)industrialization may have differed among regions and countries due to their 
internal structural and policy setup, a common feature across regions or countries is the membership 
in the WTO and the commitment to trade liberalization. About two-thirds of the SEE countries have 
been WTO members since early-2000 (with the exception of Montenegro which joined in 2012), 
hence experiencing a decade-long trade liberalization under the WTO rules. As Table 1 suggests, the 
WTO membership brought tariffs down by approximately 80 percent of the level prior to WTO 
accession, much more than the decline observed in the non-WTO SEE members during the same 
period. The SEE region is behind CEEB countries, who all joined WTO and also experienced 
significant tariff reductions. On the other hand, CIS and MENA lag behind, as about half their 
countries are WTO members. Still, even members there still face high tariff rates, despite important 
reduction has been observed after joining the WTO, while non-members experienced slower tariff 
declines. 
Table 1 – Weighted tariff rates of the manufacturing products (regional simple averages, %) 
    WTO members Non-WTO 
members 
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SEE 67% 7.35 3.75 1.39 5.83 2.22 
CEEB 100% 4.07 2.47 1.61 - - 
CIS 46% 6.10 4.25 2.93 6.25 5.16 
MENA 55% 18.90 10.18 5.72 20.88 12.53 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Notes: * depending on data availability; ** or the closest available figure; 
depending on data availability, the figure is for one of the years between 2000 
and 2004. 
 
So, the question arising, then, is if trade liberalization and WTO membership have a role to play for 
the (de)industrialization of the observed countries, given initial level of industrialization (in particular, 
the one when the country joins WTO). Data (Figure 3, left) clearly suggest a positive link between 
initial industrialization and deindustrialization: the higher the initial position, the deeper the decline. 
Figure 2, right, relates the industry decline with the trade liberalization. Data roughly suggest that fast 
trade liberalization (larger tariffs reduction) is related to growing manufacturing declines in regions 
with low initial industrialization, as the case of MENA suggests. On the contrary, smaller tariff 
declines (than in MENA) resulted in manufacturing ‘savings’ in the other three regions, being smaller 
in CEEB than in SEE and CIS.  
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Figure 2 – Tariff reduction and deindustrialization by region 
 
Source: Authors’ draft based on WDI data. 
Notes: * Tariff change refers to the absolute difference between the tariff level in 2012 and when the country 
joined WTO for member and in 2000 for non-members. Hence, a negative value of the x-axis on the right chart 
signifies a tariff reduction and vice versa. 
 
WTO may be detrimental for countries which approach trade liberalization without having 
sufficiently developed manufacturing industry before, while timely trade liberalization may actually 
help industrialize. That this may have support in the data can be guessed from Figure 3, which shows 
the same relationships as Figure 2, but for WTO members and non-members in the observed regions. 
Figure 3 - Tariff reduction and deindustrialization by WTO membership 
 
Source: Authors’ draft based on WDI data. 
Notes: * Tariff change refers to the absolute difference between the tariff level in 2012 and when the country 
joined WTO for member and in 2000 for non-members. Hence, a negative value of the x-axis on the right chart 
signifies a tariff reduction and vice versa. 
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On average, WTO members experienced slightly smaller manufacturing sector declines than non-
members (Figure 3, left).The right panel suggests that trade liberalization was likely beneficial for 
members – lower tariffs there are associated with higher industrial growth, but also that liberalization 
may be harmful for non-members – lower tariffs there are associated with lower industrial growth. So, 
the effect of trade liberalization on industrialization is likely to depend on the circumstances, being 
positive for some countries and negative for others.  
 
4. Methodology and data 
4.1. Basic model 
The model used in the analysis links developments in manufacturing value added in different 
industries with the tariff rate, only through the channel(s) through which the latter may influence the 
former.More precisely, the basic model is: 
𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗 + 𝛼1𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑗𝑡   (1) 
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑗𝑡    (2) 
where i indexes the industries, j the countries and t the time, 𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡stands for the logarithm of the 
manufacturing value added, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡is the ad-valorem tariff rate imposed onto industry i in country j 
at time t; X is a vector of conventional explanatory variables, like road density, credit to GDP, foreign 
investment to GDP, log of GDP per capita, spending on education in GDP, market capitalization in 
GDP and trade to GDP;αj’sare the country fixed effects, while αt’s the time fixed effects; εijt‘s are the 
error terms, which are assumed to be well-behaved (which is controlled by reporting errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation). Note that we do not use industry fixed effects, since the 
model becomes bulky and suffers widespread multicollinearity; however, their omitting is 
acknowledged and results’ robustness to this omission tested in Section 5.4.Also note that the 
manufacturing value added likely comes with a stochastic trend and we hence use the lagged value on 
the right-hand side. 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 stands for one of the three channels through which tariff imposition 
potentially affects value added - import, export and comparative advantage.  
 
4.2. Tariffs’ endogeneity 
The econometric challenge in estimating (1) and (2) is that tariffs are almost always endogenous to 
the industry value added. The underlying premise of the endogenous tariff theory (Brock and Magee, 
1978; Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) is that “political decisions on tariff rates are reflections of the selfish 
economic interests of voters, lobbying groups, politicians, or other decision makers in trade policy 
matters.” (Mayer, 1984, p.970), despite the post-WTO era reduced the excessive use of trade policies. 
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We, therefore, need to find a suitable instrument that affects tariff, but not value added (nor the 
channels) directly except through the tariff. In technical terms, to our system of equations (1) and (2), 
we need to add a third equation: 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜓 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑡 + 𝜀3𝑖𝑗𝑡     (3) 
Whereby notations are self-explanatory. A plausible candidate to be considered for instrument in this 
context is the bound tariff rate set by WTO. The bound tariff rate is likely to satisfy the two conditions 
for a good instrument – it is likely to be exogenous with respect to the industry value added, because 
it is determined by the WTO. More precisely, it is unlikely that the bound tariff is correlated with the 
shocks onto the value added. It is also likely to be correlated with the tariff rate that countries charge, 
because it, in a certain way, represents a ceiling for the actual rates.  
Still, a possible counter-argument is that when bound tariffs are set during negotiations, the level of 
development of a country is considered. Even if there is a correlation between country’s level of 
development and the level of bound tariffs, by considering industry-level data, we actually investigate 
how tariffs affect the dynamics of the industrial value added and not the growth of the entire economy 
or manufacturing sector. From that viewpoint, the bound tariff should still preserve its exogeneity 
assumption with respect to the industry value added. 
Additional argument against our instrument may be that bound tariffs are set taking into consideration 
the level of development of individual industries. More precisely, bigger industries may be more able 
to push for higher bound tariffs, due to their power. To control for this possibility, in the robustness 
checks section, we add additional stage in the estimation, in which the bound tariffs are modeled as a 
function of the average value added for each industry in each country. 
A second candidate for instrumenting tariffs is their past value. Lagged tariffs are also likely to satisfy 
the two criteria for a good instrument: i) they are likely correlated with the tariffs of the next period 
(consider that, especially within WTO, governments prevent large and unexpected changes in tariffs); 
and ii) it is unlikely that former tariffs are correlated with the current shocks on the value added. 
 
4.3. Estimable model 
The model that we estimate is given by the following five-equations: 
𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∙ 𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗 + 𝛼1𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑗𝑡  (4) 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑2 ∙ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑗𝑡       (5) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑2 ∙ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑡 + 𝜀3𝑖𝑗𝑡       (6) 
𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑2 ∙ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑗 + 𝛼4𝑡 + 𝜀4𝑖𝑗𝑡       (7) 
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𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽5 ∙ 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜓 ∙ 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑡 + 𝜀5𝑖𝑗𝑡      (8) 
Whereby notations are as before; 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of the imports of industry i in country j at time t; 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of exports respectively; 𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the revealed comparative advantage index 
calculated as the share of the country j's exports of industry i at time t in total export of the same 
country, divided by the share of exports of the same industry at the same time of the sample countries 
in their total export. The vector of control variables includes the log of the GDP per capita, the share 
of foreign direct investment in GDP, the public spending on education in GDP, the market 
capitalization of listed firms in GDP, trade openness, an indicator of public infrastructure and credits 
to GDP. They are to capture various development that may have affected (the speed of) 
industrialization in the countries investigated. 
 
4.4. Estimation technique 
Given that we need to estimate a system of five equations, we rely on Roodman’s (2011) Conditional 
Mixed Process (CMP) estimator which allows mixing the standard limited dependent variable models 
in multi-equation systems. The CMP method is a parametric one, meaning that distributional 
assumptions are imposed on the model which leads to higher efficiency. The standard IV approach, 
however, is not; there is an implied trade-off between both estimators. As our model is not recursive 
and fully articulated, i.e. equations for earlier stages include instruments to address endogeneity and 
omit some variables, the applied estimator is a limited-information (LIML) estimator. 
 
4.5. Data 
The empirical analysis is done at the industry level. By using industry-level data, the bias from 
omitted variables or model specification that plagues cross-country studies isarguably diminished, 
because the omitted variables are less likely to affect all the industries. The analysis focuses on 
manufacturing industries.In that way the study can rule out factors that would keep manufacturing 
underdeveloped as those factors should not affect the differences between manufacturing industries 
(Rajan and Subramanian, 2011, p. 100).The level of aggregation of the industries is at the 4-digit ISIC 
classification. 
We use annual data. The sample is composed of 25 countries from the transition regions of CEEB, 
SEE and CIS and from the MENA region. These countries were chosen on the basis of the availability 
of industry-level data. The time period covers 1990-2010, but differs from country to country and 
depends on the data availability. For most of the countries the analysed period covers only the 2000’s. 
Data on industrial value added, import and export are from UNIDO. Data on tariffs are from 
TRAINS. Data on bound tariffs are from WTO. Data on the other variables used as controls are from 
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the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Data on non-tariff measures are from WTO’s 
Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP). See Appendix 1 for further details. 
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5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Validity of instruments 
Because we are dealing with a multi-equation system, we cannot provide the conventional instrument 
tests. Hence, to provide some preliminary evidence for the validity of our instruments, we run a 
conventional Two Stage Least Squares model, whose first stage regresses tariffs on the two 
instruments, while the second-stage regresses the log of the value added on tariffs and other variables 
(given the constraint to produce these tests for a multi-equation system). Four tests about instruments 
are reported in Table 2. The first three tests the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are 
weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor; the provided F-statistics are far above the rule of 
thumb of 10, providing evidence that both instruments are strong. The last one tests the null that the 
excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term; the p-values provide sufficient evidence 
that the null cannot be rejected, at least at the 5%, hence supporting our argument about instruments’ 
exogeneity with respect to the value added. 
Table 2– Instruments’ tests 
 Only 
tariffs 
Tariffs 
and 
channels 
Tariffs, 
channels and 
controls 
Under identification test  
(Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic) 
100.1 68.55 60.22 
Weak identification test  
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
35282 23691 5060 
Weak identification test  
(Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic) 
2932 1808 615.7 
Hansen J statistic 
(Over identification test of all instruments, p-value) 
0.835 0.075 0.277 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
5.2. Tariffs’ role for (de) industrialization: Baseline results 
Table 3 presents the results of our baseline model (4)-(8). The left half of the table (columns 1-5) 
presents the model without control variables, while the right half (column 6-10), with them. Including 
control variables halves our sample, but coefficients remain highly robust. Hence, we interpret the 
results with the controls (columns 6-10). Coefficients do have the expected signs and a large part of 
coefficients of interest is significant. First, we document again that we deal with strong instruments, 
as both the bound tariff and the lagged tariff are highly significant in the first-stage regression. The 
coefficients suggest that lagged tariff positively affects the current tariff, with a fairly large 
coefficient, suggesting that 94% of the current tariff rate is due to the tariff in the period before. This 
corroborates our earlier guess that governments would refrain from abrupt changes of tariffs, in order 
to comply with the needs of the WTO membership where applicable, but also to smooth traders’ 
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incentives. Bound tariff also positively affects the average tariff, although the coefficient is fairly low: 
average tariffs reduce with the reduction of bound tariffs, but the moves may be sluggish.  
Results suggest that tariffs, then, affect import and the revealed comparative advantage, but not 
export. An increase of the tariff by one percentage point results in a reduction of import by 1.3%, on 
average, ceteris paribus. Or, if one takes the interquartile range of the tariff rate as a measure for a 
normal change in tariffs (see Appendix 2 for the descriptive statistics of the variables), one could see 
that increase in tariffs by 11 percentage points reduces imports by roughly 15%. Tariff is insignificant 
for export, which is also an expected result, given our earlier claims that tariffs are mainly associated 
with import, despite we identified some possible ways in which it could affect export. Finally, an 
increase of tariff by one percentage point is found to result in an increase of the RCA index by 0.05 
index points, which is fairly small magnitude, likely a result of the fact that major part of our sample 
is small economies. To comprehend the magnitude of this change, note that for a country to move 
from the first to the third quartile along RCA’s distribution, an increase of tariffs by 130 percentage 
points would be needed. Indeed, this finding may explain the liberalization-productivity channel: 
declining tariffs resulted in lower comparative advantages of the countries, probably because their 
productivity levels were relatively low when liberalization started, insufficient to compete on foreign 
markets. 
Finally, results in column (10) suggest that only import and export are important for the value added 
of the industrial sector. This suggests that tariffs work only through the main channel– import: larger 
tariff reduces import, which then feeds into lower value added. Tariff has not affected export, but 
export is found to have increased value added. Finally although tariff affects competitiveness, it does 
not channel to manufacturing value added, as the comparative advantage is found insignificant for the 
latter. 
To understand the magnitudes of the identified channel(s), one needs to consider the lagged value 
added in column (10). It is significant and fairly large, suggesting that the value added is likely to 
follow a stochastic trend, which if not properly modelled may lead to wrong inference. Due to the 
presence of this lagged variable, the remaining coefficients are ‘short-term’ ones. We obtain the long-
run coefficients by dividing the short-term ones with (1 – coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable). If import increases by 1%, manufacturing value added is predicted to increase by 0.1%. If 
export increases by 1%, manufacturing value added is predicted to increase by 0.5%. Apparently, the 
export plays stronger role for the manufacturing production, but is not determined by tariffs. Overall, 
under the case of trade liberalization, a reduction of the tariff rate by 1percentage point will result in 
an increase of import of 1.3%, converting into a 0.13% increase of the manufacturing value added. Or, 
reduction in the tariff rate by 11 percentage points (the interquartile range) will results in 15% higher 
imports and 1.5% higher value added. This main finding suggests that in the overall sample, trade 
liberalization may have been timely, i.e. resulted in support of the industrialization processes. 
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Turning the focus on the control variables, the first result to note is the unexpected coefficients on the 
infrastructure and credit indicators. Better roads seem to lower industry value added, as well an 
additional percentage of bank credits into the economy. Under the assumption that roads are built by 
the government with public money, the finding may suggest a crowding out effect, especially if the 
road building has been financed with domestic debt. On the other hand, the negative effects of credits 
on value added may suggest a misallocation of bank money: they have likely supported sectors which 
were not growing; or simply favoured consumption loans. Contrary to this, FDIs supported 
industrialization, while trade openness reduced value added. 
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Table 3 – Baseline results 
 Baseline system System including control variables 
Dependent variables: Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA 
index 
Log of value 
added 
Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA 
index 
Log of 
value added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag of log VA 
    
0.870*** 
    
0.879*** 
 
    
(0.003) 
    
(0.004) 
Log of import 
    
0.013*** 
    
0.012*** 
 
    
(0.003) 
    
(0.005) 
Log of export 
    
0.061*** 
    
0.058*** 
 
    
(0.003) 
    
(0.005) 
RCA index 
    
0.012 
    
0.013 
 
    
(0.020) 
    
(0.020) 
Tariff rate 
 
-0.004*** -0.001 0.000* 
  
-0.013*** 0.001 0.000** 
  
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  
  
(0.001) (0.002) 0.000  
 Bound tariff 0.079***    0.079***    
 (0.005)     (0.008)     
Lag of tariff rate 0.936*** 
    
0.857*** 
     (0.004) 
    
(0.005) 
    Road density  
    
-1.996*** -0.007 -0.007 0 -0.010*** 
 
     
(0.218) (0.010) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) 
Credit to GDP 
     
0.123*** 0.003 0.004 0 -0.001** 
 
     
(0.031) (0.010) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001) 
FDI to GDP 
     
0.355*** 0.002 -0.016 -0.002 0.002** 
 
     
(0.070) (0.013) (0.018) (0.003) (0.001) 
Log of GDP p/c 
     
-30.108*** 1.989 2.708 0.348 -0.111 
 
     
(1.250) (1.324) (1.831) (0.275) (0.101) 
Spending for education to GDP 
    
3.042*** 0.162 0.034 0.035 0.005 
 
     
(0.536) (0.126) (0.171) (0.026) (0.019) 
Market capitalization to GDP 
     
0.070*** -0.002 0.003 0 -0.001** 
 
     
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 0.000  
Trade to GDP 
     
-0.074*** 0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.004*** 
 
     
(0.023) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -1.245*** 9.790*** 5.906*** 0.117*** 1.622*** 345.345 -5.283 -12.46 -3.224 3.247*** 
 -0.252 -0.109 -0.155 -0.028 -0.054 -38.966 -12.006 -16.602 -2.497 -0.978 
Observations 24,665 24,665 24,665 24,665 24,665 11,391 11,391 11,391 11,391 11,391 
Source: Authors’ calculations.*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed 
effects not reported due to space, but available on request. 
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5.3. Is the effect driven by WTO? 
The main result we obtained in the previous section may seem small: a reduction of the tariff by one 
percentage point results in an increase of industry value added by 0.13%. However, if one considers 
the difference between median tariff rates in WTO and non-WTO countries, of 6.5% and 11.9%, 
respectively, than a WTO membership may be perceived to result into higher manufacturing value 
added by 0.8%. But, is this the case? Table 4 provides some preliminary evidence if WTO 
membership – and hence, trade liberalization due to the accession to the WTO – led to some changes 
in industrial value added. The result is that it did not. In order words, trade liberalisation in general, 
irrespective of whether it has been associated with WTO or not, resulted in higher industrial value 
added. Note that our results in Table 4 are pure OLS estimates, but largely resemble the main findings 
of Table 3; only a dummy for WTO membership is added and it is insignificant in any composition of 
the main equation. 
Table 4 – WTO membership and industrialization 
 
 Only WTO WTO and 
trade-related 
WTO, trade-related 
and controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lag of log VA 0.944*** 0.870*** 0.879*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) 
WTO membership 0.023 0.011 -0.047 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.160) 
Log of import 
 
0.009*** 0.011** 
 
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Log of export 
 
0.064*** 0.060*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 
RCA index 
 
0.02 0.009 
 
 
(0.013) (0.016) 
Road density  
 
-0.011*** 
 
  
(0.003) 
Credit to GDP 
  
-0.001** 
 
  
(0.001) 
FDI to GDP 
  
0.002** 
 
  
(0.001) 
Log of GDP p/c 
  
-0.128 
 
  
(0.127) 
Spending for education to GDP  
 
0.005 
 
  
(0.022) 
Market capitalization to GDP 
  
-0.001*** 
 
  
0.000  
Trade to GDP 
  
-0.004*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
Constant 0.567*** 1.516*** 2.830*** 
 (0.104) (0.143) (0.969) 
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Observations 23,099 15,299 7,768 
R-squared 0.94 0.947 0.952 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed effects 
not reported due to space, but available on request. 
 
Still, we investigate the idea that WTO-induced trade liberalization led to changes in industrial value 
added for a while more. To do so, one needs to recognize that a WTO trade agreement sets up tariff 
bindings for each country and sector – the instrument we used in our previous calculations. If the 
applied tariff is then lower than the bound tariff, the government has the flexibility to increase the 
applied tariff in order to protect the import market without paying any costs (Rho, 2012).In other 
words, the positioning of the applied tariff vis-à-vis the bound tariffs not driven by the WTO, but is 
determined by the country itself. The difference between the bound and the current applied tariff is 
known as the tariff overhang. The overhang is different across countries and sectors. Beshkar et al. 
(2015) provide evidence that the overhang reduces with country size. The overhang is suitable for 
investigating if the effect of tariffs on industrialization is driven by WTO or by individual countries’ 
decision. If the overhang is significant, that could be treated as evidence that the effect of tariffs is due 
to the latter. 
Table 5presents the estimates of the system of equations (4)-(8) with the tariff replaced by the tariff 
overhang. The sample size drops, because we drop the periods when countries were not (yet) 
members of the WTO. We instrument the overhang with its lagged value. Table 5largely replicates 
the results in Table 4, but the overhang is significant only in the import equation (column 2) and 
further loses significance when control variables have been added (column 7). Larger overhang results 
in larger import, since the country has lower tariff compared to its binding, which then translates into 
larger manufacturing value added. This suggests that the effect of tariffs on the industry value added 
is not due to WTO membership, but due to countries’ individual decision to lower the tariffs. 
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Table 5 – WTO-led (de)industrialization 
 Baseline system System including control variables 
Dependent variables: Tariff 
overhang 
Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA 
index 
Log of value 
added 
Tariff 
overhang 
Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA 
index 
Log of 
value added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag of log VA 
    
0.870*** 
    
0.879*** 
 
    
(0.003) 
    
(0.004) 
Log of import 
    
0.012*** 
    
0.011*** 
 
    
(0.003) 
    
(0.004) 
Log of export 
    
0.062*** 
    
0.059*** 
 
    
(0.003) 
    
(0.004) 
RCA index 
    
0.012 
    
0.008 
 
    
(0.017) 
    
(0.017) 
Tariff overhang 
 
0.003*** 0.001 0.000 
  
0.002 -0.005 0.000 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
 Lag of tariff overhang 0.933*** 
    
0.865*** 
     (0.004) 
    
(0.005) 
    Road density  
    
2.091*** -0.767 -1.135 0.025 -0.010*** 
 
     
(0.224) (1.052) (1.619) (0.257) (0.003) 
Credit to GDP 
     
-0.142*** 0.231 0.205 -0.003 -0.001** 
 
     
(0.032) (0.321) (0.493) (0.079) (0.001) 
FDI to GDP 
     
-0.374*** 0.302 0.36 0.002 0.002** 
 
     
(0.071) (0.399) (0.613) (0.097) (0.001) 
Log of GDP p/c 
     
32.257*** 27.851 41.336 -0.863 -0.111 
 
     
(1.281) (36.561) (56.063) (8.890) (0.101) 
Spending for education to GDP 
    
-3.166*** 5.619 7.622 -0.116 0.005 
 
     
(0.549) (7.616) (11.702) (1.857) (0.019) 
Market capitalization to GDP 
     
-0.076*** 0.31 0.445 -0.009 -0.001** 
 
     
(0.010) (0.437) (0.671) (0.106) 0.000  
Trade to GDP 
     
0.080*** -0.067 -0.097 0.002 -0.004*** 
 
     
(0.023) (0.107) (0.164) (0.026) (0.001) 
Constant 0.910*** 12.949*** 12.451*** 0.134*** 1.634*** -366.328 -234.274 -346.575 7.307 3.245*** 
 (0.251) (0.106) (0.147) (0.020) (0.052) 0.000  (322.808) (494.790) (78.472) (0.978) 
Observations 19,615 19,615 19,615 19,615 19,615 9,219 9,219 9,219 9,219 9,219 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed 
effects not reported due to space, but available on request. 
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5.4. Is the effect due to cheaper inputs or due to competition?  
The finding that trade liberalization increases imports and hence production can be due to two 
underlying mechanisms. The first one is that liberalization results in imports of inputs in the 
production process which were either inexistent or more expensive on the domestic market 
previously. The second one is that lower tariffs result in cheaper imports, and hence in fiercer 
competition on the domestic market, which spurs innovation among domestic firms and increases 
production.  
One way to tell which of the two effects dominates is to observe if the relationship between the tariffs 
and the value added is present in industries which produce intermediate or consumption goods. If the 
effect is present in intermediate goods industries, the underlying channel is more likely to be the 
cheaper inputs. If the effect is present in the consumption goods industries, the underlying channel is 
more likely to be competition. One needs to be cautious with this interpretation, however, because the 
competition channel may be present in the inputs sector, too. 
Table 6 presents the results of the baseline regression, estimated on industries that can be classified as 
producing inputs and consumption goods5. One can see that the results for the inputs are very similar 
to the baseline results, the only difference being that the imports are insignificant for the value added 
(but with a similar coefficient as in the baseline regression). Turning to the consumption goods, one 
can see that the results are slightly different here. Once again, higher tariffs result in lower imports 
and, through this, in lower value added, but, on the other hand, here higher tariffs result in higher 
exports and, through this, in higher value added, too. In total, the exports channel prevails, meaning 
that for consumption goods, trade liberalization, i.e. lower tariffs, results in lower value added. 
Therefore, it would seem that trade liberalization affects inputs and consumption goods differently. 
Lower tariffs on inputs lead to higher production of inputs, while lower tariffs on consumption goods 
lead to lower production of consumption goods. Because the results for the inputs are very similar to 
the results obtained from the whole sample of countries, we could say that the inputs channel 
dominates.  
                                               
5For this purpose, first the BEC correspondence codes were found to the ISIC codes used so far. Then, the 
following codes were classified as consumption goods: 112 (Food and beverages, primary, mainly for 
household consumption), 122 (Food and beverages, processed, mainly for household consumption), 522 
(Transport equipment, nonindustrial), 61 (Consumer goods not elsewhere specified, durable), 62 (Consumer 
goods not elsewhere specified, semi-durable), 63 (Consumer goods not elsewhere specified, nondurable). All the 
remaining codes were treated as inputs. In other words, the inputs group contains both the capital and the 
intermediate goods. 
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Table 6 – Inputs and consumption goods 
 Inputs Consumption goods 
Dependent variables: Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA 
index 
Log of value 
added 
Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA 
index 
Log of 
value added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag of log VA     0.883***     0.873*** 
     (0.005)     (0.008) 
Log of import     0.009     0.016** 
     (0.006)     (0.008) 
Log of export     0.056***     0.060*** 
     (0.006)     (0.008) 
RCA index     0.008     0.043 
     (0.022)     (0.059) 
Tariff   -0.013*** -0.002 0.000*   -0.019*** 0.037*** -0.000  
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)   (0.005) (0.006) (0.000)  
Bound tariff 0.083***     0.064***     
 (0.009)     (0.019)     
Lag of tariff  0.850***     0.934***     
 (0.005)     (0.009)     
Road density -0.009 -0.006 -0.011 -0.001 -0.008** 0.068** -0.007 -0.016 0.001 -0.017*** 
 (0.041) (0.012) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.018) (0.024) (0.002) (0.005) 
Credit to GDP -0.072 0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.001* -0.250*** -0.006 -0.008 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.058) (0.012) (0.016) (0.003) (0.001) (0.047) (0.018) (0.023) (0.002) (0.001) 
FDI to GDP 0.071 0.001 -0.017 -0.002 0.002 0.148 0.006 -0.013 -0.001 0.003* 
 (0.140) (0.016) (0.022) (0.004) (0.001) (0.110) (0.024) (0.032) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log of GDP p/c 1.261 1.534 1.788 0.472 -0.075 3.809*** 2.500 3.345 0.143 -0.197 
 (0.978) (1.576) (2.223) (0.406) (0.121) (0.776) (2.352) (3.147) (0.220) (0.180) 
Spending for education to GDP 1.424 0.161 0.053 0.051 -0.041* 4.736*** 0.207 -0.059 0.004 0.100*** 
 (1.093) (0.149) (0.207) (0.038) (0.022) (0.857) (0.224) (0.295) (0.021) (0.035) 
Market capitalization to GDP -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.028 -0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.027) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade to GDP -0.025 0.002 0.009 0.002 -0.005*** -0.085*** 0.001 0.007 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.020) (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant -12.751 -6.410 -7.280 -5.090 4.490*** -41.297*** -16.134 -15.119 -1.643 6.448*** 
 (11.379) (16.363) (13.799) (4.220) (1.493) (8.964) (24.427) (20.181) (2.371) (2.326) 
Observations 7,481 7,481 7,481 7,481 7,481 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed 
effects not reported due to space, but available on request. 
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5.5. Some robustness checks 
We conduct four robustness checks of our results: first we use variables scaled to GDP instead of their 
logarithms; second, we augment the previous specification with two explanatory variables related to 
terms of trade and real effective exchange rate; third, we control for the average value added in the 
baseline model; and fourth, we control for the presence of non-tariff measures. 
First, we again draft Table 3, with relative values of the value added, import and export to GDP, 
instead of their logged values. Table 7presents the results. Since we divide industry-level variables 
with country-level ones, some of the coefficients are very small. However, the story of Table 3is 
largely reproduced: only the import channel is robustly working for the trade liberalization to support 
industrialization: a decrease of the tariff by one percentage point translates into an increase of the 
manufacturing value added in GDP of about 0.000003 percentage points. 
The only difference between these and the baseline results is that when controls are added, the export 
channel gains significance at the 5%. Results suggest it may work in the same fashion as the import 
channel, i.e. an increase in tariffs reduces export, which reduces value added. This is in line with the 
suggestions of Lerner (1936) and Tokarick (2006) who identified a couple of veins through which 
raising tariff may harm export: by reducing the relative price of exports; by real exchange rate 
appreciation; and by increasing the rental price of capital and hence reducing export and output. 
However, this result is not stable and should be discussed with caution. 
Second, augmenting the model with additional explanatory variables to control for the real effective 
exchange rate and the terms of trade as veins through which tariff may affect the manufacturing value 
added in line with the discussion in Tokarick (2006) suggests that the general conclusions arising 
from the previous model estimate are remarkably confirmed (Table 8). Both the import and export 
channels were supportive for the industrialization in an environment of decreasing tariffs. The real 
effective exchange rate and the terms of trade are not statistically significant in the equations 
explaining the channels; nevertheless, their changes have positive and statistically significant effects 
on the value added of industrial sector. 
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Table 7 – Relative values to GDP of the main variables used 
 Baseline system System including control variables 
Dependent variables: Tariff Import to 
GDP 
Export to 
GDP 
RCA 
index 
Value added 
to GDP 
Tariff Import to 
GDP 
Export 
to GDP 
RCA 
index 
Value added 
to GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag of VA to GDP     0.864***     0.852*** 
     (0.004)     (0.005) 
Import to GDP     7.302**     7.759** 
     (3.396)     (3.675) 
Export to GDP     39.291***     42.076*** 
     (3.092)     (4.367) 
RCA index     0.005     0.010 
     (0.006)     (0.007) 
Tariff rate  -0.000*** 0.000  0.000*   -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000**  
  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000   
Bound tariff 0.079***     0.081***     
 (0.005)     (0.008)     
Lag of tariff rate 0.936***     0.856***     
 (0.004)     (0.005)     
Road density      -1.996*** 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
      (0.219) 0.000  0.000  (0.002) (0.001) 
Credit to GDP      0.122*** 0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000* 
      (0.032) 0.000  0.000  (0.002) 0.000  
FDI to GDP      0.350*** 0.000  0.000  -0.002 0.000  
      (0.070) 0.000  0.000  (0.003) 0.000  
Log of GDP p/c      -30.118*** 0.000  0.000  0.351 -0.050* 
      (1.258) 0.000  0.000  (0.277) (0.028) 
Spending for education to GDP      3.037*** 0.000  0.000  0.035 -0.005 
      (0.539) 0.000  0.000  (0.026) (0.005) 
Market capitalization to GDP      0.070*** 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
      (0.010) 0.000  0.000  (0.001) 0.000  
Trade to GDP      -0.073*** 0.000  0.000  0.001 -0.000* 
      (0.023) 0.000  0.000  (0.001) 0.000  
Constant -1.261*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.116*** 0.011* 345.363 -0.001 -0.002 -3.232 0.525* 
 (0.272) 0.000  0.000  (0.028) (0.007) 0.000  (0.004) (0.003) (2.508) (0.271) 
Observations 25,124 25,124 25,124 25,124 25,124 11,563 11,563 11,563 11,563 11,563 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed 
effects not reported due to space, but available on request. 
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Table 8 – Relative values to GDP of the main variables used and two additional explanatory 
variables 
 System including control variables 
Dependent variables: Tariff Import to 
GDP 
Export 
to GDP 
RCA 
index 
Value added 
to GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag of VA to GDP     0.848*** 
     (0.005) 
Import to GDP     8.154** 
     (3.649) 
Export to GDP     42.805*** 
     (4.324) 
RCA index     0.010 
     (0.007) 
Tariff rate  -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Bound tariff 0.082***     
 (0.007)     
Lag of tariff rate 0.857***     
 (0.004)     
Road density -0.152 0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
 (1.361) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Credit to GDP -0.154* -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.083) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
FDI to GDP -0.014 0.000  0.000  -0.001 0.000  
 (0.209) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Log of GDP p/c 3.390 0.000  0.000  0.235 -0.042 
 (20.447) (0.000) (0.000) (0.302) (0.028) 
Spending for education to GDP 0.968 0.000  -0.000  0.026 0.001 
 (0.857) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.005) 
Market capitalization to GDP -0.017 0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  
 (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Trade to GDP 0.030 0.000  0.000  -0.000 0.000 
 (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Terms of trade 0.000 -0.000  0.000  -0.001* 0.000*** 
 (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
REER 0.049 0.000  0.000  0.001 0.000*** 
 (0.095) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Constant -28.475 -0.000 -0.001 -2.102 0.282 
 (220.303)  (0.004) (0.003) (2.686) (0.282) 
Observations 11,573 11,573 11,573 11,573 11,573 
 
As argued in Section 4.2, the results obtained in Table 3could be criticized for the possibility that the 
bound tariffs are set taking into consideration the level of development of individual industries. More 
precisely, bigger industries may be more able to push for higher bound tariffs, due to their power. To 
control for this possibility, we include additional stage in the estimation, in which the bound tariff is a 
function of the average value added of the respective industry in the respective country. These results 
are presented inTable 9. As can be seen, the average industry value added is a significant and positive 
determinant of the bound tariffs, suggesting that bigger industries may indeed push for higher bound 
tariffs. However, the results of the other five equations remain robust to this treatment, implying that 
our previous results are still likely to be valid.  
 24 
Table 9 – Results when average VA is controlled for 
Dependent variables: Bound tariff Tariff Import to 
GDP 
Export to 
GDP 
RCA index Value 
added to 
GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of average industry VA 0.690***      
 (0.083)      
Lag of VA to GDP      0.760 
      (0.007) 
Import      0.013*** 
      (0.005) 
Export      0.058*** 
      (0.005) 
RCA index      0.013 
      (0.020) 
Tariff rate   -0.012*** 0.002 0.000*  
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)  
Bound tariff  0.200***     
  (0.013)     
Lag of tariff rate  0.861***     
  (0.005)     
Road density 0.004 -0.057* -0.007 -0.012 -0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.143) (0.030) (0.010) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) 
Credit to GDP -0.011 -0.227*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.099) (0.042) (0.010) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001) 
FDI to GDP -0.006 0.086 0.003 -0.016 -0.002 0.002** 
 (0.137) (0.100) (0.013) (0.018) (0.003) (0.001) 
Log of GDP p/c 0.353 2.354*** 1.925 2.505 0.347 -0.110 
 (4.488) (0.696) (1.323) (1.831) (0.275) (0.101) 
Spending for education to GDP -0.075 2.257*** 0.168 0.042 0.035 0.005 
 (0.672) (0.772) (0.125) (0.171) (0.026) (0.019) 
Market capitalization to GDP -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) 
Trade to GDP -0.004 -0.050*** 0.002 0.008 0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.040) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 3.633 -19.367** -10.379 -10.617 -3.749 5.032*** 
 (49.542) (8.080) (13.733) (12.104) (2.973) (1.260) 
Observations 12,453 12,453 12,453 12,453 12,453 12,453 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Country and time fixed effects not reported due to space, 
but available on request. 
 
We finally conduct a robustness check by adding a variable of non-tariff measures in the model. The 
variable measures the number of non-tariff measures applied to specific industry.Columns (1) to (5) of 
Table 10 provide the results. They suggest that the more numerous the non-tariff measures, the higher 
the import and export of the industries. At first sight this may be a surprising result. There are few 
possible explanations of the positive sign (see, e.g. Carrère and de Melo, 2011; Staiger, 2012). First, 
the number of NTMs cannot precisely reflect the magnitude of their restrictiveness for trade, since it 
is based on a broad set of measure affecting both the import and the export size, so that it may 
frequently result in opposite-than-expected effect. Second, NTMs not necessarily coincide with non-
tariff barriers (NTBs). For example, a palette of measures may not necessarily harm trade as long as 
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the imported goods are within the standards; examples may include measures affecting the 
living standards and preventing disease spreading. Third, the measure we use is a de-jure one which 
implies that implementation may lag behind what is written in laws and procedures. This is 
considerably reasonable explanation in countries with still feeble institutions. Finally, the introduction 
of the NTMs may have coincided with the tariff reduction: had the latter been larger – in ad-valorem 
terms – than the former, a positive result may be obtained.  
To control for this, we add to the system a sixth equation, whereby NTMs are regressed on tariffs and 
the other controls. Our assumption is that the introduction of the NTMs may have been a response to 
the tariff reduction. The new system of equations is presented in columns (6) to (11) of Table 10. We 
still do not prove the hypothesis of the trade-off between NTMs and tariffs: an increase of the tariff by 
one percentage points led, on average, to increase of the number of NTMs by 0.005. This may seem 
small, however, may be of no importance, given the unknown ad-valorem equivalent of the 
introduced NTM. Still, controlling for the possible trade-off between tariffs and NTMs makes the 
result we got previously insignificant, except for the RCA. However, given that the RCA channel was 
found insignificant for the manufacturing value added, we could conclude that NTMs did not impose 
any statistically significant effect for manufacturing value added in the investigated countries. 
The remaining coefficients endure robustness to this treatment. 
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Table 10 – The role of non-tariff measures 
 NTMs are not affected by tariffs  NTMs are affected by tariffs 
Dependent variables: Tariff Import to 
GDP 
Export to 
GDP 
RCA 
index 
Value 
added/GDP 
Tariff Non-tariff 
measures 
Import to 
GDP 
Export to 
GDP 
RCA 
index 
Value 
added/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Lag of VA to GDP     0.879***      0.879*** 
     (0.004)      (0.004) 
Import to GDP     0.012**      0.012** 
     (0.005)      (0.005) 
Export to GDP     0.058***      0.058*** 
     (0.005)      (0.005) 
RCA index     0.013      0.012 
     (0.020)      (0.020) 
Tariff rate  -0.013*** 0.000 0.000**   0.005*** -0.013* 0.000 0.001**  
  (0.001) (0.002) 0.000    (0.002) (0.009) (0.012) 0.000   
Non-tariff measures  0.051*** 0.060*** -0.002    0.000 0.106 -0.019***  
  (0.009) (0.013) (0.002)    (1.883) (2.602) (0.002)  
Bound tariff 0.080***     0.080***      
 (0.007)     (0.007)      
Lag of tariff rate 0.858***     0.858***      
 (0.004)     (0.004)      
Road density -0.262 -0.007 -0.012 0.000 -0.010*** -0.264 0.001 -0.007 -0.012 0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.208) (0.010) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.208) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) 
Credit to GDP -0.185*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001** -0.185*** 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.052) (0.010) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001) (0.052) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) 
FDI to GDP -0.035 0.002 -0.016 -0.002 0.002** -0.035 0.007 0.003 -0.016 -0.002 0.002** 
 (0.097) (0.013) (0.018) (0.003) (0.001) (0.097) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.003) (0.001) 
Log of GDP p/c 9.237** 1.936 2.547 0.344 -0.11 9.195** -0.73 1.898*** 2.581*** 0.331 -0.111 
 (4.288) (1.321) (1.828) (0.275) (0.101) (4.287) (1.712) (0.089) (0.122) (0.277) (0.101) 
Spending for educ. to GDP 0.938 0.164 0.037 0.035 0.005 0.945* 0.058 0.167 0.034 0.036 0.005 
 (0.571) (0.125) (0.170) (0.026) (0.019) (0.571) (0.152) (0.165) (0.224) (0.026) (0.019) 
Market capitalization to GDP -0.032** -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001** -0.032** 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 0.000  (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 0.000  
Trade to GDP 0.037 0.002 0.008 0.001 -0.004*** 0.036 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.028) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -70.053* -4.784 -10.711 -3.17 3.244*** -69.639* 6.374 -4.458 -11.011 -3.06 3.249*** 
 (38.964) (11.977) (16.570) (2.497) (0.978) (38.951) (15.493) 0.000  0.000  (2.512) (0.978) 
Observations 11,401 11,401 11,401 11,401 11,401 11,857 11,857 11,857 11,857 11,857 11,857 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed effects not 
reported due to space, but available on request. 
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6. Comparative analysis 
6.1. Transition economies vs. MENA 
Despite the unambiguous evidence that trade liberalization resulted in support of the industrialization 
process in the overall sample, we investigate further this issue in a comparative context across 
different group of countries in the sample. Namely, there have been successes but also failures to 
industrialise in this group of economies. As discussed previously, the initial substantial decline of the 
manufacturing value added share in the 90’s has been followed by significant industrialisation in 
CEEB. On the other hand, there are many examples of failed industrialisations in the SEE and CIS. In 
some other developing countries from the MENA region, a failure to industrialise can also be 
observed. Thus, a comparative analysis of the trade liberalisation effects on the (de)industrialization 
process could prove more insightful among these groups of countries. 
Table 11presents the estimates of the system of equations (4)-(8) separately for the different groups of 
countries. The findings for the overall sample that trade liberalization supported industrialization are 
confirmed for the CEEB and to some extent for the CIS, though with some important differences 
regarding the transmission channels. In the case of CEEB, the results suggest that tariffs affect both 
import and export, but not the revealed comparative advantage. An increase of the tariff by one 
percentage point results in a reduction of import and export by 1.7% and 0.8%, respectively, on 
average, ceteris paribus. Although the effect on import is higher than that of the overall sample by 0.4 
p.p., it is not transmitted to the value added since its coefficient is statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level of significance. On the other hand, the export is important for the value added of 
the industrial sector. Lower tariff in the CEEB increases export, which then feeds into higher value 
added in the long run by 0.5%.Thus, the overall effect of the tariffs on the value added in CEEB is 
similar to the overall sample, albeit tariffs work through export and not import. This is in line with the 
argumentation in Tokarick (2006) that a higher tariff would raise the rental rate on capital which itself 
would raise costs of production in the export sector and reduce output. This might not be surprising 
given that the CEEBs have made great use of foreign financing in different forms, and in particular 
FDIs, in comparison with the rest of the countries from the sample. These large inflows of foreign 
funds then made capital cheaper, cutting the cost of production in the export sector and increasing 
output. In the case of CIS, the results suggest that tariffs affect only import, but not export and the 
revealed comparative advantage. An increase of the tariff by one percentage point results in a 
reduction of import by 0.3%, on average, ceteris paribus, which makes around a quarter of the 
coefficient value estimated for the overall sample. Nevertheless, in the value-added equation both the 
import and export are important determinants in line with the results for the overall sample. Thus, 
reducing the tariff in the CIS increases import, which then translates into higher value added in the 
long run by 0.1%, which is qualitatively similar to the effect for the whole sample. The positive effect 
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of export on value added is found to be double than that of the import, but this seems not to be 
induced by the tariffs.  
As for the SEE and MENA, the results suggest that trade liberalisation did not affect the 
industrialisation process via reducing the tariff level. In both cases, the tariff affects import, but its 
effect is not transmitted to manufacturing value added in these countries. The latter is affected by 
export but this is driven by factors other than the tariffs. The only difference between these two 
groups of countries which makes simultaneously the SEE distinct from the rest of the countries in the 
sample is the statistically significant effect of tariff on the revealed comparative advantage. Yet this 
does not change the overall conclusion about the lack of influence of trade liberalisation on the 
industrialisation in the SEE. 
In general, the main finding from the comparative analysis suggests that trade liberalization resulted 
in support of the industrialization processes in the CEEB and CIS, although via different trade 
channels; that is via export for the CEEB which transmits stronger effects to the value added than the  
import channel in the case of CIS. Conversely, the substantial tariff reduction in MENA and, in 
particular, in the SEE played no role for the industrialisation. This suggests that relatively fast trade 
liberalisation might have been pre-mature since some other factors important for creating an 
industrialisation-supportive environment have not been in place in the SEE and MENA, in contrast to 
the rest of the countries in the sample, in particular to CEEB. The latter were likely to take advantage 
of the geographical proximity to the high-technology old-EU countries in accordance with the 
findings in Gamberoni et al. (2010) and Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales (2014). In addition, the CEEB 
were more timely reformers than the rest of the countries in the sample in terms of lifting the border 
barriers to doing business that awarded them with higher FDIs flowing from the old EU members, 
which supported the industrialization process. In other words, Baldwin (2011)’s win-win situation in 
international trade - my factories for your reforms –seems to have worked successfully in the case of 
CEEB.  
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Table 11 – Transition countries vs. MENA 
 CEEB MENA 
Dependent variables: Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA index Log of value 
added 
Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA index Log of value 
added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag of log VA 
    
0.867*** 
    
0.891*** 
 
    
(0.006) 
    
(0.007) 
Log of import 
    
-0.002 
    
0.011 
 
    
(0.007) 
    
(0.008) 
Log of export 
    
0.081*** 
    
0.033*** 
 
    
(0.007) 
    
(0.008) 
RCA index 
    
0.009 
    
0.008 
 
    
(0.036) 
    
(0.070) 
Tariff rate 
 
-0.017*** -0.008*** -0.000 
  
-0.004*** -0.001 0.000 
  
 
(0.002) (0.002) 0.000  
  
0.001  0.001  0.000  
 Bound tariff    0.109***    
      (0.001)     
Lag of tariff rate 0.942*** 
    
0.928*** 
     (0.007) 
    
(0.006) 
    Constant 22.444 8.608*** 6.695 -0.856** 2.954*** -71.415*** 10.145*** 10.293*** -0.792 1.541* 
 15.033 4.129 5.272 0.347 0.535 22.765 4.501 6.281 0.622 0.846 
Observations 5,158 5,158 5,158 5,158 5,158 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,749 
 
  
CIS 
    
SEE 
  Lag of log VA 
    
0.836*** 
    
0.858*** 
 
    
(0.013) 
    
(0.010) 
Log of import 
    
0.034* 
    
0.019 
 
    
(0.021) 
    
(0.014) 
Log of export 
   
0.068*** 
    
0.058*** 
 
    
(0.015) 
    
(0.012) 
RCA index 
    
0.025 
    
0.112 
 
    
(0.041) 
    
(0.084) 
Tariff rate 
 
-0.003** -0.001 0.000 
  
-0.025*** 0.006 0.003** 
  
 
0.002  0.002  0.001  
  
0.003  0.005  0.002  
 Bound tariff 0.118*** 
    
0.336*** 
     (0.010) 
    
(0.013) 
    Lag of tariff rate 0.909*** 
    
0.653*** 
     (0.013) 
    
(0.013) 
    Constant 0.485 10.389*** 9.659*** -0.792 4.484*** 45.320 13.383*** 11.819*** 0.781*** 1.429*** 
 2.896 1.588 2.369 0.622 1.017 42.947 0.564 0.877 0.266 0.346 
Observations 2,752 2,752 2,752 2,752 2,752 3,062 3,062 3,062 3,062 3,062 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed 
effects and control variables not reported due to space, but available on request. 
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6.2. Industries with different level of value added 
Finally, we evaluate whether there are differences in the effects of tariffs on value added for different 
industries, i.e. for industries with high value added and for industries with low value added. The main 
argument for this distinction is that industries with low value added may consist mainly of young 
firms, which may need some time to develop, so may benefit from the trade protection, differently 
from the industries with high value added, which are usually mature.  
We classify the industries into these two groups depending on whether an industry in a given year has 
a value added which is higher than the average value added for all the industries in that country. If this 
is the case, we classify the industry as an industry with high value added. 
The results are presented in Table 12. As can be seen from the first panel, for the industries with high 
value added, higher tariffs lead to lower imports, but not exports and comparative advantage. The 
effect is such that one percentage point increase in the tariff rate reduces imports by 0.9 per cent. The 
value added, then, depends on the imports in a positive manner (higher imports = higher value added). 
Therefore, higher tariffs lead to lower value added, due to the lower imports, as in the overall sample. 
The size is such that this 0.9 per cent lower imports result in 0.05 per cent lower value added, in the 
long run.  
Things are different for industries with low value added. Here, higher tariffs lead to lower imports, 
and through this, to lower output, just as previously. One percentage point increase in the tariff rate 
reduces imports by 2.9 per cent, which then translates into 0.2 per cent lower output. But higher tariffs 
here lead to higher exports, and through this, to higher output, differently from the high value added 
case. The effect is such that one percentage point higher tariff raises exports by 0.7 per cent, which 
then raises value added by 0.2 per cent. In sum, the imports effect and the exports effect net each other 
out, as a result of what the overall effect of the tariffs on the value added is insignificant.  
Therefore, to summarize the analysis for the different industries, we find some evidence that 
protectionism may be beneficial for industries with low value added, differently from industries with 
high value added. These findings are in accordance with Stiglitz (2005) and Shalaeddin (2006a,b). 
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Table 12 – High value added industries vs. Low value added industries 
 High value added Low value added 
Dependent variables: Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA index Log of value 
added 
Tariff Log of 
import 
Log of 
export 
RCA index Log of value 
added 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag of log VA     0.761***     0.790*** 
     (0.009)     (0.007) 
Log of import     0.014**     0.015** 
     (0.006)     (0.006) 
Log of export     0.035***     0.061*** 
     (0.006)     (0.007) 
RCA index     0.007     0.078 
     (0.016)     (0.076) 
Road density -0.223*** -0.014 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.039* -0.006 -0.023 0.000 -0.013*** 
 (0.044) (0.016) (0.022) (0.004) (0.003) (0.022) (0.013) (0.017) (0.001) (0.004) 
Credit to GDP 0.037 -0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.015 0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.040) (0.015) (0.021) (0.004) (0.001) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI to GDP -0.637** -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.094 0.010 -0.019 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.250) (0.020) (0.027) (0.005) (0.001) (0.114) (0.019) (0.025) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.667 3.473 1.002 0.192 -0.237* 1.247*** 0.609 2.323 0.034 0.061 
 (0.571) (2.219) (3.033) (0.541) (0.127) (0.263) (1.729) (2.337) (0.122) (0.136) 
Spending for education to GDP -0.559 0.117 -0.269 0.030 -0.008 1.611*** 0.243 0.264 0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.705) (0.183) (0.248) (0.045) (0.024) (0.330) (0.189) (0.249) (0.013) (0.025) 
Market capitalization to GDP -0.101*** -0.007 -0.006 0.001 -0.000 -0.031*** 0.003 0.009 -0.000 -0.001* 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) 
Trade to GDP -0.049** 0.023** 0.027* 0.001 -0.002* -0.019** -0.017 -0.014 0.000 -0.004*** 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bound tariff 0.091***     0.018*     
 (0.012)     (0.009)     
Tariff rate  -0.009*** -0.002 0.000   -0.029*** 0.007** 0.000***  
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)   (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)  
Lag of tariff rate 0.829***     0.948***     
 (0.007)     (0.006)     
Constant 21.633*** -16.022 -3.202 -1.095 5.399*** -16.437*** 5.453 -14.171 -0.397 2.872*** 
 (7.226) (14.580) (32.662) (3.555) (0.916) (3.996) (11.519) (26.000) (1.361) (0.940) 
           
Observations 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 6,317 6,317 6,317 6,317 6,317 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors given in parentheses. Country and time fixed effects and control 
variables not reported due to space, but available on request. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we evaluate if trade liberalization has been supporting the industrialization process in 
transition countries. More precisely, we investigate if tariffs affect industry value added in 25 
countries from CEEB, SEE, CIS and MENA over the period1990-2010. We utilise an instrumental 
variable approach, using the bound tariffs and the lagged tariff as instruments for the actual tariff.  
Our findings suggest that lower tariffs have likely resulted in higher value added, overall, and that this 
has been through the higher imports. On the other hand, the other channels through which tariffs can 
affect industry value added have not been supportive to the industrialization process. Thus, tariff has 
not affected export, but export is found to have increased value added. Although tariff affects 
competitiveness, it does not channel to manufacturing value added, as the comparative advantage is 
found insignificant for the latter.  
The underlying mechanism behind the imports’ effect is that the liberalization resulted in imports of 
inputs in the production process which were either inexistent or more expensive on the domestic 
market previously. Comparing to the consumption goods, the trade liberalization affects inputs and 
consumption goods differently. Lower tariffs on inputs lead to higher production of inputs, while 
lower tariffs on consumption goods lead to lower production of consumption goods. Yet due to the 
similarity with the results obtained from the whole sample of countries, we could say that the inputs 
channel dominates.  
The trade liberalization effects on the industrialization process have not been due to the WTO 
membership, but due to countries’ autonomous decision to lower the tariffs. Although the tariff 
reductions might be followed by increasing use of non-tariff measures, our results suggest that latter 
did not impose any statistically significant effect for manufacturing value added in the investigated 
countries. 
Differentiating between different geographical regions, our findings imply that lower tariffs likely 
resulted in higher value added in the CEEB and CIS countries. The export materialized as the 
significant channel in the CEEB, while the import channel was more important for supporting 
industrialization in CIS. On the other hand, tariffs played no role for industrialization in MENA and 
SEE, which may be explained by the possibly pre-mature trade liberalization in these countries. That 
this may indeed be the case can be inferred from our final analysis, which distinguishes between 
different maturities levels of the industries. More precisely, we find that industries with higher value 
added (more mature industries) benefit from trade liberalization; that is, lower tariffs lead to higher 
value added, due to the higher imports. On the other hand, the industries with lower value added 
(young industries) do not benefit from the liberalization since the overall effect of the tariffs on the 
value added is insignificant. 
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To summarize, our findings support trade liberalization, but only for mature industries. This could 
imply that protectionism may be beneficial for young industries, which is in accordance with some of 
the previous researches. Although the countries from CEEB, SEE, CIS and MENA experienced 
significant tariff reductions during the last two decades they could reconsider their trade policies for 
young industries in line with these findings.  
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Appendix 1.Variable description, sample period and sources 
Country Value 
added 
Import Export/  
RCA 
Tariff Bound 
tariff 
Road 
density 
Credits FDI GDP per 
capita 
Spending 
on 
education 
Market 
capitaliz. 
Openness REER Terms of 
trade 
Azerbaijan 2001-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 2002-2009* - 2000-2010 1992-2010 1995-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010* 1998 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Bulgaria 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1998-2006* - 2000-2010 1991-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010* 1995-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Cyprus 1999-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1996-2002* - 2000-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010* 1991-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Czech R. 1999-2007 1993-2010 1993-2010 1997-2003 - 2000-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010* 1994-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Egypt 1997-2010* 1994-2010 1994-2010 1995-2009* 1995-2010 2000-2010* 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010* 1990-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010 
Estonia 2000-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1999-2003 - 2000-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1993-2010* 1997-2010 1995-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Georgia 2000-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 2002-2010* 2000-2010 2000-2010 1995-2010 1997-2010 1990-2010 1994-2010* 2000-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Hungary 1992-2009 1992-2010 1992-2010 1991-2002* - 2003-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1990-2010* 1991-2010 1991-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Iran 1994-2009 1997-2010 1997-2010 2003-2008* - 2000-2010 1990-2010 1993-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010* 1993-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Jordan 1994-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 2001-2009* 2000-2010 2000-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1996-1999* 1990-2010 1990-2007 1992-2010 1990-2010 
Kuwait 2005-2010 1990-2008 1990-2008 2005-2009* 1995-2010 2000-2010 1991-2010 1990-2010 1995-2010 1992-2006* 1993-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Kyrgyz R. 2002-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 2002-2010* 1999-2010 2000-2010* 1995-2010 1993-2010 1990-2010 1994-2010* 1999-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Latvia 1993-2010 1994-2010 1994-2010 2001 - 2000-2010 1993-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010* 1995-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Lithuania 2000-2010 1994-2010 1994-2010 2002-2003 - 2000-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1990-2010 1993-2010* 1995-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Macedonia 1997-2010* 1994-2010 1994-2010 2004-2010 2003-2010 2000-2010 1993-2010 1994-2010 1990-2010 1992-2002* 1996-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Moldova 2001-2010 1994-2010 1994-2010 2000-2010* - 2000-2010 1991-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010 1996-2010* 1996-1999 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Morocco 2000-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1993-2009* 1995-2010 2000-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2009* 1990-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010 
Oman 1993-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 2005-2009* 2001-2010 2007-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2009* 1992-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Poland 1992-2009* 1992-2010 1992-2010 1996-2003 - 2000-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1991-2010* 1991-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Qatar 2000-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 2005-2009* 1996-2010 2007-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1994-2010 1998-2008* 1997-2010* 1994-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Romania 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1999-2005* - 2000-2010 1996-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1996-2010* 1994-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Russia 2001-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1994-2010* - 2000-2010 1993-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010 2000-2008* 1991-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Slovak R. 1993-2009 1994-2010 1994-2010 2002 - 2000-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010* 1994-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Slovenia 1995-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 2002-2003 - 2000-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1991-2010* 1995-2010 1995-2010 1992-2010 2000-2010 
Turkey 1992-2009 1990-2010 1990-2010 1997-2010* 1995-2010 2003-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010 1993-2006* 1990-2010 1990-2010 1992-2010 1990-2010 
Number of 
observ. 
26.798 49.574 38.277 16.122 8.401 247 471 477 503 344 403 507 475 315 
Source: UNIDO UNIDO UNIDO TRAINS WTO WDI WDI WDI WDI WDI WDI WDI BRUEGEL WDI 
* missing data in some years 
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Variable description: 
Value added: Log of value added in current US Dollars; 
Import: Log of imports from world in current US Dollars; 
Export: Log of exports to world in current US Dollars; 
RCA: Revealed comparative advantage index as explained in details in section 4.3; 
Tariff:Ad-valorem tariff rates of manufacturing products in %; 
Bound tariff: Bound tariff rates of manufacturing products set by WTO in %; 
Road density: km of road per 100 sq. km. of land area; 
Credits: Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP); 
FDI: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP); 
GDP per capita: Log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$); 
Spending on education: Public spending on education, total (% of GDP); 
Market capitalization:Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP); 
Non-tariff measures: Number of non-tariff measures applied to specific industry 
Openness: Export and Import (% of GDP); 
REER: Real effective exchange rate index (2007 = 100); 
 
Terms of trade: Net barter terms of trade index is calculated as the 
percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import 
unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000. Unit 
value indexes are based on data reported by countries that 
demonstrate consistency under UNCTAD quality controls, 
supplemented by UNCTAD's estimates using the previous year's 
trade values at the Standard International Trade Classification. 
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Appendix 2.Descriptive statistics of variables 
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Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 5.0 5.8 5 1.2 -16.2 0 0 26.3 0 
25 percentile 3.6 8.1 8.8 6.7 0.00 15.2 7.6 17.2 18.0 0.8 3.8 7.5 63.3 0.53 
Mean 13.8 26.0 10.1 8.6 0.09 16.6 8.4 69.1 40.4 4.3 4.7 30.1 88.8 0 
50 percentile 7.5 15 10.2 8.9 0.02 16.9 8.4 44.5 32.5 2.7 4.7 18.2 88.9 0 
75 percentile 14.8 34 11.6 10.9 0.07 18.3 9.2 121.5 50.8 5.8 5.5 35.8 110.1 0 
Maximum  2314.3 100 17.6 18.2 34.27 24.6 11.0 214.5 283.5 51.0 14.2 299.0 172.9 119 
Standard deviation 46.1 28.5 2.2 3.0 0.42 2.4 1.2 60.2 35.6 6.1 1.4 37.3 30.4 3.35 
Number of 
observations 
16122 26943 49574 38277 40174 26798 63881 31369 59817 60579 43688 51181 64389 70080 
 
